Like starting iOS to developers five years succeeding, Jobs’ determination to port iTunes to Windows did not happen overnight. In some ideas, it’s easy to see what fired his terror. While in the past of the 1990s, Apple deliberately let its individual selling points get weakened. Meanwhile, Windows gathered on features, smoothed its rough edges and managed the personal computing market.
But things have changed now. Apple proceeds to make/support iTunes for Windows computing circumstances, but it doesn’t require Microsoft’s outlier tablet users which now symbolize the third-largest percentage of tablet OS behind iOS and Android (by the way, don’t assume iTunes for Android any time soon).
In fact, the iTunes ecosystem is an aggressive advantage as Apple sells its iOS tablets, smartphones as well as TV’s against Android and now Windows 8 devices. Where Windows overlooked the userbase in the early 2000s, Apple now is the leader in the modern ecosystem event.
Now Apple ought, in iTunes and the iPod, a successful combination of software and hardware that could influence new users into the Apple ecosystem. Letting either product to operate with Windows appeared like giving up an advantage.
Jobs accurately guided out that both iTunes and the iPod supported drive Mac sales. His leaders at the time — Phil Schiller, Jon Rubinstein, Jeff Robbin, and Tony Fadell — recognized that, while this was correct, Apple was no longer just about Macs. At one point, Jobs said engaging iTunes and the iPod run on PC would happen “over my dead body.”
In the end, Jobs understood the business sense in the judgment and backed down — but only after working the numbers and examining that failing Mac sales could never exceed the earnings from increased iPod sales.
This wasn’t just about addressing a new app. Apple also had to renegotiate with music labels to get them to move along with it. However, once they thumped deals, Apple began managing to control on iTunes for Windows.